Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand by Johann K. Brunner & Susanne Pech
ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE ANNUITY MARKET




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 783
CATEGORY 3: SOCIAL PROTECTION
OCTOBER 2002
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 783
ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE ANNUITY MARKET
WITH SEQUENTIAL AND SIMULTANEOUS INSURANCE
DEMAND
Abstract
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Social security systems, which in many industrialised countries are organised according to 
the pay-as-you-go method, are threatened by the ageing of the population due to a decrease 
in fertility and an increase in life-expectancy. This problem is recognised by academics as 
well as by politicians, and several possible measures to maintain the financial stability of the 
system are suggested. One of these measures is a reduction of the pension payments, and it 
seems in fact unavoidable that it will be implemented to some degree. If this is the case, then 
a natural strategy for the individuals is to raise private provision for retirement, in particular by 
an increased purchase of life annuities. As governments want to prevent old-age poverty, 
they tend to encourage private pension insurance through tax incentives.
1 
 
However, there are concerns that the market for annuities does not offer  a suitable 
supplement to the public pension system. One obvious argument is that it cannot incorporate 
redistribution, as the public system does for several reasons. Another argument concentrates 
on the phenomenon of adverse selection, which is a common problem that affects the 
efficient working of insurance markets. The present paper studies this problem in the context 
of specifically designed contracts for old-age insurance. 
 
Generally, adverse selection occurs with asymmetric information, that is, when the insurer 
has less information than the individual as to the probability that the insured event occurs. In 
case of annuities, this means that companies have less information on life-expectancy of an 
annuitant than the individual herself. As a consequence, returns from annuities cannot reflect 
individual life-expectancy but only overall life-expectancy, which in turn will induce high-risk 
individuals (that is, the long-living) to buy more annuities than low-risk individuals. This is the 
standard observation, discussed in various contributions to the literature (see, e.g., Pauly 
1974, Eckstein et al. 1985, Abel 1986, Mitchell et al. 1999, Walliser 2000). 
 
However, there is a further consequence of the adverse-selection problem, namely that the 
time structure of the benefits matters. Individuals with low life-expectancy put less weight on 
pension payouts in later periods than individuals with high life-expectancy. This aspect is 
                                                 
1   Tax incentives are granted in many industrialised countries, e. g. in Great Britain, U.S.A, Canada and Sweden. 
Moreover, the recent reform of social security in Germany aims at cutting public pensions and inducing 
individuals to pay contributions of four percent of income to a private old-age insurance by granting a tax 
release. Similarly, in Austria contributions to a private old-age insurance are subsidised by a premium since 
2000.   2
neglected in the usual overlapping-generations model with one working period and one 
period of retirement. But in reality the time of retirement must not be seen as a single, 
homogeneous period, for which provision can be made through a one-and-for-all contract 
only, with a fixed and constant (in nominal or real terms) payout. Planning individuals, being 
aware of some estimate of their life-expectancy, will attempt to make provision in accordance 
with this estimate, which means that they want to use more differentiated instruments. In 
practice, they can buy an insurance contract with payouts increasing or decreasing over 
time, or they can buy a limited-time contract for the earlier phase of retirement and then use 
another instrument to provide for the rest of their lifetime.
2 
 
In order to analyse the consequences on the functioning of the annuity market of the fact that 
the time structure of the payouts matters, one has to extend the standard model by assuming 
that retirement consists of more periods and that provision can be made separately for each 
of them. In a previous paper (Brunner and Pech 2000) we introduced a model with one 
working period and two periods of retirement, where two groups of individuals with differing 
life-expectancy buy an annuity contract which runs for the whole time of retirement, but with 
payouts possibly varying over time.
3 We have shown that in this framework an equilibrium in 
the sense of Nash-Cournot may but need not exist.
4 
 
In the present contribution we consider a similar model, but with different types of contracts. 
We again assume that individuals live for one working period and for at most two periods of 
retirement, but now contracts run for one period only; for the second period, a new contract 
has to be bought. By this formulation we take account of the fact that in reality term-insured 
pension contracts exist, which provide payouts only for a limited time, given that the 
individual is alive. For the rest some other form of provision must be made.
5  
                                                 
2   Poterba (1997) emphasizes the importance of the wide range of different annuity products for the growth of 
the U.S. annuity market. He provides a typology of individual annuities with respect to the terms under which 
accumulated capital is dispersed during the liquidation phase. In particular, he distinguishes between two 
broad classes of individual annuities, that are deferred and immediate annuities, depending on whether there 
is a waiting period between the premium payment and the beginning of the annuity payouts or not.  
The role of annuity contracts with escalating payouts in the U.K. annuity market is studied by Finkelstein and 
Poterba (2002). 
3   Yagi and Nishigaki (1993) also employed a model with one working period and two periods of retirement in 
order to discuss optimal insurance demand of a representative individual. They showed that constant annuity 
payouts over time are inefficient, given that the individual rate of time preference differs from the interest rate. 
However, they did not consider the adverse-section problem and its impact on the existence of equilibria.  
4   With these life annuities, firms can separate individuals according to their life-expectancy by a variation of the 
payouts over time. In fact, only a separating equilibrium (compare Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) can occur.  
5   Townley and Boadway (1987) studied the functioning of the annuity market when individuals save out of their 
payouts from the limited-time pension contract. In contrast, we consider the case that they can buy a second 
annuity to provide for the remaining time.    3
 
The important issue which we address is that individuals can choose between two strategies 
to provide for the second period of retirement: simultaneously, that is, individuals buy an 
additional contract already in the working period, or sequentially, that is, only those 
individuals who have survived to the first period of retirement, purchase an additional 
contract on the spot market. We show that in our model individuals in general chose only one 
of these alternatives, depending on the rates of return. However, in a first-best equilibrium 
the rates of return, which then correspond to the individual life-expectancies, assume such 
values which make individuals indifferent between the two alternatives, because each 
provides the same consumption path over lifetime. 
 
This is no longer true if asymmetric information, where the rates of return are distorted by 
adverse selection, is introduced in our model. Then, under the assumption of price 
competition between annuity companies, the rate of return for any contract is the same for 
both risk-groups, and only a situation where both groups buy the same type of second-period 
contract is feasible. Further, it turns out that the type of contract chosen to provide for the 
second period of retirement affects also the rate of return in the first period. In particular, we 
find that the two strategies have differing consequences f or the welfare of the individuals, 
because they allow different consumption paths over the time of retirement: long-living 
individuals, who put more weight on consumption in the second period, prefer the regime 
when all individuals make sequential provision, while short-living individuals prefer the 
regime with simultaneous provision. Finally, we find that only the former regime, favourable 
to the long-living individuals, represents a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. 
 
In the following Section 2 we introduce the basic model and show that either simultaneous or 
sequential annuity contracts are chosen. We characterise demand in both cases. In Section 
3 we analyse the consequences of adverse selection for the rates of return, consumption and 
welfare of the individuals. Moreover, the existence of an equilibrium is proved. Section 4 
provides concluding comments. 
 
   4
2. Sequential and simultaneous demand for annuities 
 
2.1. The basic model 
 
Consider an economy with N individuals who live for a maximum of three periods t = 0,1,2. In 
the working period t = 0, each individual earns a fixed labour income w0. At the end of period 
0 she retires and lives for at most two further periods. Survival to the retirement period t = 1 
occurs with probability  i
1 p ,  1 0 i
1 < p < . In the same way, given that an individual is alive in 
period 1, survival to period 2 occurs with probability  i
2 p ,  1 0 i
2 < p < .  
 
Provision for old age can be made through three types of contracts, which are offered by 
insurance companies:  
-   A1 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought in working period 0 and offers an 
immediate payout q1A1 in retirement period 1 
-   A2 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought in retirement period 1 and offers an 
immediate payout q2A2 in retirement period 2. 
-   D2 denotes the quantity of a contract, which is bought in working period 0 and offers a 
deferred payout r2D2 in retirement period 2. 
 
That is, each type of contract offers payouts for one period of retirement, but they differ in the 
date of purchase and the waiting period for the payout to begin: provision for retirement 
period 1 is made through A 1, while provision for retirement period 2 can be made through A 2 
(bought by those only, who survive to retirement period 1) and/or through D2 (bought already 
in the working period). q1, q2 and r2 are the corresponding payouts per unit of insurance. The 
important point of our discussion concerns the difference in the rates of return, whether the 
individuals use A 2- or D 2-contracts to have a guaranteed income in the second period of 
retirement. 
 
We assume that the individuals have no bequest motive, which means that saving is not an 
attractive strategy for them to provide for old-age. This follows from the fact that the rate of 
return of annuities is higher than the interest rate, as annuities allow to avoid (and 
redistribute) unintended bequests (see Yaari 1965). Further, in order to concentrate on the 
design of the annuity contracts and to simplify the analysis, the assumption is made that no 
public pension system exists. The budget equation of an individual i for the working period 0 







0 D A w c - - = .   (2.1) 
 
Moreover, given that individual i is alive in the retirement period 1, she can spend an amount 
i
2 A  from her income  i
1 w  in order to make additional provision for consumption in the 
retirement period 2, and consumes an amount  i
1 c . This gives us the budget equations for the 













2 D r A q c + = .  (2.3) 
 
Preferences over lifetime consumption of an individual i are time-separable and are 
represented by expected utility with a per-period utility function u depending on consumption. 
An individual i is confronted with the following two-stage decision problem: in the working 
period 0, she decides on the quantities  i
1 A  and 
i
2 D  of annuities, thus on her consumption 
level in period 0 and on her income 
i
t w  in each of the two retirement periods t = 1,2. For this 
decision she takes into account her optimal annuity demand  i
2 A  and her optimal 
consumption levels in periods 1 and 2, which she will choose in period 1, given that then she 
is alive. Formally, this two-stage problem can be written as:  
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1 p +   (2.5) 
     s. t. (2.2) and (2.3), 
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Concerning the A 2-contract, we in fact assume that the individuals are informed about its 
return q 2 already in the working period 0, in other words, that the insurance companies can 
credibly commit to offer those contracts with return q 2 one period later. Otherwise j
i would 
not be well-defined. Further, we assume  0 ) c ( u i
t > ¢ ,  0 ) c ( u i




. Notice that 
the specification of the decision problem means that the individuals have no bequest motive 
and do not discount future consumption for any reason other than risk aversion.  
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By inserting (2.1) into (2.4) and differentiating with respect to  i
1 A  and  i
2 D  as well as inserting 
(2.2) and (2.3) into (2.5) and differentiating with respect to  i
2 A , we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker 
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where by application of the Envelope Theorem 
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.  (2.10) 
 
Obviously, an i ndividual i always has a positive annuity demand  i
1 A  for the first-period 
contract, since this is the only possibility to provide for first-period consumption, while she 
can decide either to buy the immediate annuity contract (i.e.  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 = ) or the deferred 
contract (i.e.  0 Ai
2 = ,  0 Di
2 > ) or both kind of contracts (i.e.  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 > ) in order to 
make provision for consumption in t he second retirement period. The following Lemma 
shows that the latter case is in general excluded. 
 
Lemma 1: In general, it is not optimal for an individual i to choose both  0 Di
2 >  and  0 Ai
2 > . 
The inequality q1q2 < r2 (q1q2 > r2) implies  0 Di
2 >  and  0 Ai
2 =  ( 0 Ai
2 >  and  0 Di
2 = , resp.). 
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2 1 w ) w , q , w ( q q ¶ j ¶ , which in general will not be equal to 








2 w ) w , q , w ( r ¶ j ¶  in (2.7a). As we know that (2.6) must always be fulfilled, 
this means that the equations in (2.7a) and (2.8a) cannot hold simultaneously. By the same   7
reasoning, one observes that if (2.8a) holds, (2.7b) can be fulfilled only if r 2  £ q 1q2, and 
analogous for (2.7a) and (2.8b).   Q.E.D. 
 
One unit of income invested into the first-period contract transforms into a payout of q1, out of 
which an A 2-contract can be bought, which offers q 2 as the rate of return. Therefore, the 
decisive relation is q1q2 < > r2, whether provision for the second period of retirement should be 
the made through a A 2- or a D2-contract. (Only in case of q1q2 = r2, the individuals would be 




2.2. The influence of the rates of return on annuity demand 
 
For the discussion of how annuity demand depends on the rates of return, we note as a 
preparation: 
 




i j  is strictly concave with respect to  i
1 w  and  i
2 w . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
In the following, we distinguish between two different situations, whether an individual 
expresses annuity demand sequentially or simultaneously.  
 
Sequential annuity demand:  0, Ai
1 >   0, A
i
2 >   0 D
i
2 = . 
Let  i
t A (q1,q2), t =1,2, be annuity demand arising from a two-stage decision process, whose 
optimal solution is characterised by (2.6) and (2.8a), for given q1 and q2.  
 
Lemma 3: We denote the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of relative risk aversion for the functions u 






















i ¶ j ¶ ¶ j ¶ - ” j . 
For any given rates of return q1 and q2, the effect of a marginal increase in qt, t = 1,2, on the 
annuity demand  i
t A (q1,q2) of an individual i for each contract depends on the coefficients 
i Rj 
and  i
u R  of relative risk aversion in the following way: 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
To provide some intuition for this result we consider case (i), the effect of a marginal increase 
of q1 on  ) q , q ( A 2 1
i
1 . We compute  1 2 1
i
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.  (2.11) 
 
Since the denominator of the RHS of (2.11) is negative due to strict concavity of  ) c ( u i
t  and of 




i j  (see Lemma 2),  1 2 1
i
1 q ) q , q ( A ¶ ¶  has the same sign as the 









1 w q ¶ j ¶ p = ) with respect to q1, i.e. it describes the effect of an increase in 
q1 on the marginal utility of  i
1 A  in period 1, if we take  i j  as a utility function, depending on 
i
1 w . It is intuitively plausible that demand for annuity  i
1 A  increases (which means that 
instantaneous consumption  i
0 c  decreases), if the marginal utility of future income from the 
annuity increases with  1 q . Moreover we note that this effect on the derivative of  i j  can 
immediately be seen to have the same sign as 
i R 1 j - , which explains the result. 
 
Similar considerations apply for the other cases. We only mention that, as annuity demand 
) q , q ( A 2 1
i
2  is normal with respect to income in period 1, the decisive question for the cross 
effect in case (ii) is whether an increase of q1 increases  i
1 w . This certainly occurs if demand 
for  ) q , q ( A 2 1
i
1  increases with  1 q  (i.e., if  0 R 1
i ‡ - j ). Otherwise the effect is undetermined.   
 
Simultaneous annuity demand:  0, Ai




2 > = . 
Now we consider annuity demand  ) r , q ( A 2 1
i
1  and  ) r , q ( D 2 1
i
2 , determined by (2.6) and the 
equation in (2.7a). With  0 Ai
2 =  these equations reduce to (see (2.9), (2.10)) 
 







1 0 = p + - - -   (2.12)   9









1 0 = p p + - - -   (2.13) 
 
Lemma 4: The effect of a marginal increase in q1 and r2, resp., on annuity demand depends 
on the coefficient 
i
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The intuitive reason for these results is analogous to that offered above. The relevant issue is 
how an increase of q 1 or r 2 affects marginal utility of the respective annuity. R u £ 1 means 
that marginal utility increases, then  i
1 A  increases with q 1 and decreases with r 2, and vice 
versa for  i
2 D .  
 
 
2.3. The influence of the survival probabilities on annuity demand 
 
As a next step we show how demand for annuities depends on the individuals' probabilities 
of survival. 
 
Lemma 5:  
(i)   In case of sequential annuity demand, i.e.  0 Ai
1 > ,  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 = : For any given rates 
of return q1, q2, we have 
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(ii)   In case of simultaneous annuity demand, i.e.  0 Ai
1 > ,  0 Ai
2 = ,  0 Di
2 > : For any given 
rates of return q1, r2, we have   10
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Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We find that generally annuity demand reacts positively, if any probability of survival 
increases. However, there is an essential difference between the two cases, which concerns 
the cross effect of  i
2 p  on the first-period contract. With sequential decisions, an increase of 
the probability of survival to the second-period of retirement increases demand  i
1 A , because 
this allows to buy more insurance for period 2. On the other hand, with simultaneous 
decisions an increase of  i
2 p  means that insurance for the first period of retirement is 
substituted by insurance for the second period of retirement. Note further that an increase in 
i
1 p  clearly increases the probability  i
2
i
1p p  of survival to the second period as well, hence 
demand for the second-period contracts rises in both cases. 
 
 
2.4. Individually fair contracts 
 
An annuity is said to be individually fair, if expected payouts equal its price. This requires for 
the A1-, A2- and D2-contract that the respective condition 
 
  0 q 1 t
i
t = p - , t = 1,2,  (2.14) 




1 = p p - .  (2.15) 
 
hold. Obviously, this implies that the annuity companies make zero expected profits, given 
that identical individuals buy these contracts. 
 
Lemma 6: Given individually fair contracts, any individual is indifferent between choosing an 
A2- or D 2-contract for the second period or retirement. She chooses the same level of 
consumption in every period t = 0,1,2. 
   11
Proof: The zero-profit conditions (2.14), (2.15) imply q 1q2  = r 2, which is the condition for 
indifference, as mentioned above. Considering (2.6) – (2.10), one observes that the zero-





0 = = , irrespective of the chosen contracts. 
      Q.E.D. 
 
In a first-best world, where every individual can buy an annuity contract whose rate of return 
is precisely adjusted to her life-expectancy, it does not matter, which type of contract is 
chosen for provision for the second period of retirement. Anyone offers an optimal smoothing 
of consumption. However, in reality, asymmetric information prevents the supply of first-best 
contracts. This has consequences for the functioning of the annuity market in our model, as 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.  The consequences of asymmetric information on the  
  rates of return and on the existence of equilibria 
 
3.1. Adverse selection with two groups of individuals 
 
Suppose that the otherwise identical individuals are divided into two groups i = L,H, 
characterised by different risks of a long life, i.e. by different probabilities of survival  L
t
H
t p > p  
for t = 1,2. Let g0 and 1 - g0, resp., denote the shares of the high-risk and low-risk individuals 
in period 0, with 0 < g0 < 1. The probabilities  i
t p  and g0 are public information, known by the 
annuity companies. But it is the private information for each individual to know her type, i.e. 
her probability of survival. As a consequence, there is an adverse-selection problem in the 
annuity market. Moreover, we assume that there is perfect competition among the annuity 
companies and that they cannot  monitor whether consumers buy annuities from other 
insurance companies, which seems to be a reasonable assumption frequently made for the 
annuity market (see e.g. Pauly 1974, Abel 1986, Brugiavini 1993, Walliser 2000). It follows 
that in equilibrium for each type of contract only one price, that is one payout q1, q2, r2, resp., 
per unit of annuity, can exist for each period t = 1,2.  
 
Consider the individually fair rates of return of the A 1-, A 2- and D 2-contract as defined by 
(2.14) and (2.15). It is obvious from our assumption on the probabilities of survival that these 
rates are higher for type-L individuals than for type-H individuals. Therefore, asymmetric 
information excludes the first-best solution, because different rates of returns cannot exist. 
Both types of individuals buy the same contract, which is called a pooling situation.   12
Moreover, the same argument implies that only a situation, where both groups use the same 
type of contract in order to provide for the second period of retirement, can prevail. That is, 
either both groups use the A 2-contract for the second period of retirement or both groups use 
the D 2-contract. This follows from the fact that only one rate of return q1 for the first-period 
contract A 1 can exist, and that each group chooses either the A 2- or the D 2-contract, 
depending on whether q 1q2  < > r2 (see Lemma 1). Thus we distinguish between two different 
regimes, where all individuals demand either sequential or simultaneous pooling contracts: 
 
  sequential regime:   0 Ai
1 > ,  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 =   for i = L, H,  
  simultaneous regime:  0 Ai
1 > ,  0 Ai
2 = ,  0 Di
2 >   for i = L, H. 
 
As a next step we discuss, to which extent the adverse-selection problem matters in the two 
regimes, that is, whether individuals with a long life-expectancy buy a larger amount of the 
different types of contracts.  
 
Lemma 7:  
(i)   In the sequential regime, for any rates of return q 1,q2, an individual with high survival 
probabilities demands larger quantities of annuities than an individuals with low survival 




t >  t = 1,2.  
(ii)   In the simultaneous regime, for any rates of return q 1,r2, an individual with high survival 
probabilities demands a larger quantity D 2 than an individual with low survival 




2 > . The ratio of demand for the A 1-contract is 
undetermined. 
 
Proof: Follows immediately from Lemma 5 and  H
t
L
t p < p , t = 1,2.  Q.E.D. 
 
If one defines the problem of adverse selection by the extent to which the ratio of aggregate 
group-H demand to aggregate group-L demand exceeds  ) /( 0 0 1 g - g  (the ratio in case that 
demand is proportional to the population shares), we find that this problem certainly occurs 
for both contracts in the sequential regime; in the simultaneous regime it occurs for the 
second-period contract, while for the first-period contract it is mitigated by the fact that an 
increase of  i
2 p  decreases demand for the A1-contract. 
   13
The consequence of the over-representation of high-risk individuals among aggregate 
annuity demand is that in equilibrium insurance companies offer a rate of return which is 
lower than the actuarially fair rate corresponding to the average probability of survival of the 
population. The respective rates are determined by the condition that, due to the assumption 
of perfect competition in the annuity market, the expected profits of a (pooling) contract, 
bought by both groups L and H, must be equal to zero. As 
i
t t q p  is the expected payout for 
group i, the zero-profit-conditions for the A1- and the A2-contract read 
 







1 0 = p - g + p - g -   (3.1) 







2 1 = p - g + p - g - .  (3.2) 
 
Since type-H individuals have a higher probability to survive to retirement period 1, i.e. 
H
1 p  >  L





1 0 1 p g - + p g p g ” g , while the share of 
type-L individuals reduces to (1 - g1). Thus relatively more type-H individuals will buy an A 2-
contract for the retirement period 2. In the simultaneous regime, where the A 1-contract is 
supplemented by the D 2-contract, the expected payout from the latter is  i
2
i
1 2 r p p , and the 
zero-profit condition reads 
 











2 0 = p p - g + p p - g - .  (3.3) 
 
Note that the equilibrium rates of return cannot be computed explicitly from (3.1) – (3.3), 
because in each equation annuity demand depends on the respective rates. Nevertheless, if 
one takes the ratio of aggregate demand of group L to that of group H as exogenous for the 
moment, one observes that the respective equilibrium rate is lower, the lower this ratio. In the 
next section we turn to a closer analysis of this relation.  
 
 
3.2. Rates of return and consumption in both regimes 
 
Our aim is to study how the functioning of the annuity market is affected, when annuity 
companies can offer both kinds of second-period contracts, namely immediate as well as 
deferred annuities. For this purpose, from now on we assume that instantaneous utility is 
logarithmic, i.e. 
   14
  ) c ln( ) c ( u i
t
i
t =  for t = 0,1,2.   (3.4) 
 
Logarithmic utility has the convenient property that annuity demand of an individual i for any 
contract does not depend on the payoff of this contract, which helps to keep the analysis 
simple.
6 First we determine annuity demand for logarithmic utility in both regimes. (In the 
following, a tilde refers to the sequential regime, while a bar refers to the simultaneous 
regime.) 
 
Sequential regime: The conditions (2.6) and (2.8a) together with (2.9) determine annuity 
demand  i
1 A ~  and  i
2 A ~  for each single-period contract. For logarithmic utility one computes 
 













p + p +
p + p
= ,  (3.5) 











) 1 ( 1
q A
~
p + p +
p p
= .  (3.6) 
 
Simultaneous regime: By use of (2.12), (2.13) and (3.4) we obtain annuity demand  i
1 A  for the 
first-period contract and annuity demand  i
2 D  for the second-period contract as 
 







) 1 ( 1
A
p + p +
p
= ,  (3.7) 









) 1 ( 1
D
p + p +
p p
= .   (3.8) 
 
Lemma 8: The consumption level  i
0 c  of an individual i in working period 0 is the same 
irrespective whether she chooses sequential or simultaneous pension insurance.  
 
Proof: This result follows from the fact that  i
1 A ~  =  i
1 A  +  i
2 D : substituting (3.5) and  0 Di
2 =  into 
(2.1) gives the same consumption level  i
0 c  as substituting (3.7) and (3.8) into (2.1).  Q.E.D. 
 
Note that Lemma 8 holds for any contracts with rates of return q 1,q2 and q 1,r2, since the 
relevant annuity demand and thus consumption in period 0 does not depend on the rates of 
return, while they influence the level of consumption in the retirement periods 1 and 2. Thus, 
                                                 
6   Note that the coefficient of relative risk aversion occurring in Lemmas 3 and 4 is equal to one for logarithmic 
utility.    15
for a comparison of these under both regimes, we have to determine the rates of return 
explicitly for both regimes by inserting annuity demand into the respective zero-profit 
conditions. 
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where  ) A ~ ) 1 (( A ~ ~ L
1 0
H
1 0 1 g - g ” r  and  ) A ~ ) 1 (( A ~ ~ L
2 1
H
2 1 2 g - g ” r . 
 
Simultaneous regime: Analogously, solving (3.1), together with (3.7), for q 1 and (3.3), 
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” ,  (3.12) 
 
where  ) A ) 1 (( A L
1 0
H
1 0 1 g - g ” r  and  ) D ) 1 (( D L
2 0
H
2 0 2 g - g ” r . 
 
Lemma 9: Comparing the two regimes, the following relations hold 
(i)   between the ratios of aggregate annuity demand of group H to that of group L for the 
different types of contracts:  1 ~ r  >  1 r ,  2 ~ r  >  2 r ,  2 r  >  1 ~ r , 
(ii)  between the rates of return from the different types of contracts:  1 q ~  <  1 q ,  2 q ~  <  2 r , 
2 r  <  1 q ~
2 q ~ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The inequalities  1 ~ r  >  1 r  and  1 q ~  <  1 q  indicate that the adverse-selection problem for the first-
period contract is more severe in the sequential regime than in the simultaneous regime 
(compare the discussion after Lemma 7). The intuitive reason for this result is the following:   16
in the simultaneous regime, annuity demand  i
1 A  for the first-period contract satisfies only the 
need for future consumption in period 1. In contrast, in the sequential regime, annuity 
demand  i
1 A ~  for the first-period contract has to satisfy the need for future consumption in both 
retirement periods 1 and 2, since part of the returns  i
1 1A ~ q ~   is used for  i
2 A ~ . High-risk 
individuals choose a higher demand  i
2 A ~  than low risk-individuals (see Lemma 7), which in 
turn intensifies adverse selection for the first-period contract. Hence  1 ~ r  >  1 r , which affects 
the payoffs accordingly, inducing  1 q ~  <  1 q . 
 
The essential reason, why  2 r  <  2 ~ r  and  2 r  >  2 q ~  hold, is that from period 0 (when the D2-
contract is bought) to period 1 (when the A 2-contract is bought) the share of the high-risk 
individuals in the population rises, i.e. g0 < g1, because of  H
1
L
1 p < p . As the ratio of individual 







2 D D A ~ A ~ = , see (3.6) and (3.8)), these shares 
indeed are responsible for the lower rate of return of the A 2-contract compared to that of the 
D2-contract.  
 
A further important result of Lemma 9 is the inequality  2 1q ~ q ~  >  2 r . Remember that  2 1q ~ q ~  is the 
payout resulting from one unit of income, invested in the working period 0 in order to provide 
for the second period of retirement in the sequential regime. It is  larger than  2 r , the 
corresponding payout in the simultaneous regime. This can be explained by the fact that in 
the former regime provision for period 2 is made via the first-period contract A 1, which is 
bought by the low-risk individuals to a larger extent than the D2-contract (note that  1 ~ r  <  2 r ). 
In other words, in the sequential regime the high-risk individuals, when insuring for the 
second period, profit from being for the first period in a pool with the low-risk individuals, who 
put particular weight on insurance for this period, due to their short life-expectancy. In a 
sense, this result represents the counterpart to the above argument explaining why  1 q ~  <  1 q . 
 
Having determined annuity demand and the rates of return in both regimes, we are ready to 
calculate the consumption levels in retirement periods 1 and 2. 
 
Lemma 10:  
(i)   In retirement period 1, consumption of any individual i = L,H, is lower in the sequential 




1 <  for i = L,H.  
(ii)   In retirement period 2, consumption of any individual i = L,H, is higher in the sequential 




2 >  for i = L,H.    17
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Consumption in each period of retirement depends on the amount of annuities bought for 
that period and on their rates of return. Lemma 10 shows that the relations between the 
respective rates of return ( 1 q ~  <  1 q ,  2 r  <  1 q ~
2 q ~ ), as found in Lemma 9 (ii), are in fact decisive 
for the distribution of consumption over the two periods of retirement in the two regimes. With 
the sequential regime, more consumption is postponed to the second period of retirement, 
while the simultaneous regime induces individuals to consume relatively more in the first 
period of retirement.  
 
For an illustration of the results of this section, we determine the consumption possibility 
curves in  ) c , c ( i
2
i
1 -space under each regime. For this, we use the convenient property that 
the consumption level in period 0 of an individual i is independent of the chosen regime.  
 




2 q ~ c A ~ = (see (2.3) for  0 Di





1 A ~ A ~ q ~ c - = , one 
obtains the consumption possibility curve, denoted by  i







2 c q ~ A ~ q ~ q ~ c - = .  (3.13) 
 




1 c , c ) for an individual i who invests the fixed amount  i
0 0
i
1 c w A ~ - =  into the first-period 
contract. She can consume all returns  i
1 1A ~ q ~  in period 1 ( 0 ci
2 =  gives  = i
1 c i
1 1A ~ q ~ ) or 
transform part of it into second-period consumption, by buying the sequential second-period 
contract. If she transforms everything ( 0 ci
1 = ), then  i
1 2 1
i
2 A ~ q ~ q ~ c =  results. An individual i 
chooses demand  i




1 p +  subject to the consumption possibility 
set. The payoffs  2 1 q ~ , q ~  in turn are determined such that the zero-profit conditions with actual 
demand of both groups are fulfilled.  
 
Simultaneous regime: Analogously, by use of  i
1 A ~  =  i
1 A  +  i




1 A q c = ,  i
2 2
i
2 D r c = , the consumption possibility curve, denoted by  i













r c - = ,  (3.14) 
   18
which is depicted in Figure 2. In this regime, the trade-off between consumption in period 1 
and in period 2 is  1 2 q / r - , which is the ratio of the returns to investing (in the working period 
0!) one unit into the contract for the second and for the first retirement period, resp. Clearly, 
maximum consumption in each period results if everything (i.e.,  i
0 0
i
1 c w A ~ - = ) is invested 
into the corresponding annuity:  0 ci
2 =  gives  i
1 1
i
1 A ~ q c = ,  0 ci
1 =  gives  = i
2 c i
1 2A ~ r . Again, an 
individual i chooses demand  i
1 A ,  i





1 p +  subject to the 
consumption possibility set, and the payoffs  2 1 r , q  are those which fulfil the zero-profit 









Figure 1                                                                       Figure 2 
 
A comparison of the consumption possibility curves in both regimes demonstrates that the 
curve  i
SI CPC  crosses the  i
1 c -axis at a higher level than the curve  i
SE CPC , since  1 1 q q ~ < . 
The opposite holds for its crossing with the  i
2 c -axis, since  2 1 2 q ~ q ~ r < . It follows that the CPC's 
intersect and that  i
SI CPC  is flatter, i.e.  2 1 2 q ~ q / r - > - . This inequality is responsible for the 
fact that relative consumption  i
2 c / i
1 c  is lower in the simultaneous regime than in the 
sequential regime, as shown in Lemma 10. 
 
 
3.3. Equilibrium  
 
Now we turn to an analysis of whether either or both of the two regimes constitute an 
equilibrium. We call a set of contracts a pooling equilibrium in the sense of Nash-Cournot, if 
together with annuity demand of both groups i = L,H the respective zero-profit condition for   19
each contract is fulfilled and if no other contract exists, which is preferred by at least one 
group i ˛ {L,H} and which allows a nonnegative profit.  
 
Proposition 1: The sequential contracts with rates of return  2 1 q ~ , q ~  represent an equilibrium. 
 
Proof: If an additional A 1-contract with rate of return q1 >  1 q ~  was offered, both groups would 
buy that and the insurance company would make a loss. (Remember from (3.5) that demand 
is independent of q1, hence  1 q ~  is the unique payout which fulfils the zero-budget condition.) 
 
Analogously, an insurance company offering an A 2-contract with rate of return  2 2 q ~ q >  would 
make a loss (due to (3.6), demand does not depend on q2). 
 
Finally, if an alternative D 2-contract with a rate of return  2 1 2 q ~ q ~ r >  was offered, again both 
groups would buy that (see Lemma 1) and the insurance company would make loss. This 
follows from the fact that demand is independent of r2 (see 3.8) and the zero-profit conditions 
require  2 1 2 q ~ q ~ r <  (see Lemma 9 (iii)).   Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2: The simultaneous contracts with rates of return  1 q , 2 r  do not constitute an 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Given the simultaneous contracts, an insurance company can additionally offer a 
sequential A 2-contract with rate of return  2 q ~ . For this, note that  2 q ~  does not depend on q1, 
hence firms make a nonnegative profit by this offer. We know that  1 1 q ~ q >  and  2 2 1 r q ~ q ~ >  
from Lemma 9. Hence  2 2 1 r q ~ q > , which means that any individual will accept the offer (see 
Lemma 1).  Q.E.D. 
 
Remember that it is in the working period 0 when an individual opts either for the D2- or the 
A2-contract. Hence, the assumption made in section 2.1 that in period 0 insurance 
companies can credibly commit to offer the sequential contract with rate of return  2 q ~  one 
period later, is essential for these results.  
 
Intuitively there are two reasons why the  sequential regime with rates of return  2 1 q ~ , q ~  
constitutes an equilibrium: i) From the results before we know that the sequential regime 
allows higher consumption levels in the second retirement period. Thus, it is plausible that no 
better D 2-contract can be offered without making a loss. ii) No higher rate of return than  1 q ~    20
can be granted for the A 1-contract, in view of the fact that individuals use part of the returns 
from this A1-contract to provide for the second period via the A2-contract.  
 
Conversely, the simultaneous regime  with rates of return  1 q , 2 r   is not an equilibrium, 
because firms can additionally offer an A 2-contract with return  2 q ~ , which combined with the 
existing A 1-contract with return  1 q  allows higher consumption levels in both retirement 
periods. (Obviously however, the existing A1-contract with return  1 q  would make a loss in this 
case, because  1 q ~  is the highest return compatible with sequential contracts.)  
 
In the final step of our analysis, we study welfare of both types of individuals i = L,H in the 
two regimes, in order to find out whether the equilibrium outcome - the sequential contracts - 
is a favourable solution for one or both risk groups. We know from the discussion in section 
3.2 that the consumption possibility curves of both regimes intersect and that the sequential 
regime allows higher consumption to the left of the point of intersection, but lower 
consumption to the right. Thus, it is unclear from the analysis of the respective consumption 
possibilities alone, in which regime an individual of type i is better off. 
 
Proposition 3: An individual of type L is better off in the simultaneous regime with rates of 
return  2 1 r , q , while an individual of type H is better off in the sequential regime with rates of 
return  2 1 q ~ , q ~ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
We give a graphical illustration of Proposition 3 in Figure 3, where the consumption 
possibility curves (3.13) and (3.14) of both types of individuals i = L,H are drawn, denoted by 
L
SE CPC  and  L
SI CPC  for a low-risk type and by  H
SE CPC  and  H
SI CPC  for a high-risk type. Note 
that due to adverse selection the long-living individuals make more provision for retirement, 
therefore their consumption possibility curves are above those of the short-living.  
 
Essential for the result of Proposition 3 is that at any combination ( i
1 c , i
2 c ) the slope 





2 p -  of the indifference curve is steeper for a type-L individual than for a type-H 
individual, as  H
2
L
2 p < p . As one can show, this property implies that, irrespective of the 
regime, the optimal combination for a type-L individual is to the right of the point of 
intersection of her consumption possibility curves  L
SE CPC  and  L
SI CPC , while the optimal 
consumption bundle for a type-H individual lies to the left of the intersection of  H
SE CPC  and   21
H
SI CPC . Consequently, since the simultaneous regime allows higher consumption 
possibilities to the right of the point of intersection, it is preferred by a type-L individual. The 




This result conforms with the intuition that the short-living individuals, who put more weight 
on consumption in period one, are indeed better off with that regime which provides more 
consumption in this period (Lemma 10). Conversely, the long-living individuals are better off 





Provision for old age can be made through a variety of annuity products, which differ in the 
terms concerning asset accumulation and the payout path. In the present paper we have 
concentrated on annuities which run over a limited time only and have to be supplemented 
by a second contract. This additional contract can either be bought simultaneously with the 
first or later, when an individual knows that she has survived some years of retirement. We 
have characterised demand, g iven these two possibilities, and we have studied the 


















different risk-groups of individuals prefer different strategies, but only a situation, where all 
individuals demand sequential contracts represents an equilibrium. This is favourable for the 
high-risk group, while the low-risk group would be better off with the simultaneous regime. 
This result, though derived in a specific framework, shows some similarity to conclusions 
from other models with asymmetric information, where typically the low-risk groups do not 
receive their first-best contract.  
 
The main conclusion from our contribution is that adverse selection has more severe 
consequences on the annuity market than recognised in studies using the standard 
overlapping-generations model. These mainly concentrate on the influence of adverse 
selection on a single rate of return for a uniform period of retirement. By extending this model 
and making the realistic assumption that provision for retirement need not be made through a 
once-and-for-all annuity contract, but can be made through different contracts for earlier and 
later phases of retirement, one finds that adverse selection also affects the choice of 
contracts as well as the existence and properties of equilibria.  
 
For this analysis, a crucial issue is the range of annuity contracts or their combinations 
available to the individuals. Further research is needed in order to clarify the functioning of 
the market, if additional types of contracts, for instance packages of first- and second-period 
insurance, are introduced. A particularly interesting question is whether with appropriate 
contracts our undesirable result that the adverse-selection problem not only reduces the 
rates of return but also leads to an equilibrium regime, which is unfavourable for the short-
living individuals, can be overcome.    
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
From (2.9) we have  
 










i 2 ¶ ¶ - - = ¶ j ¶   
 
In case  0 Ai
2 = ,  0 Di
2 > , we have  0 w / A i
1
i
2 = ¶ ¶ , while in case  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 = , implicit 
differentiation of (2.8a), with  i
1 1
i
1 A q w = , gives us 
 

















2 p + - - = ¶ ¶ ,  
 
which lies between 0 and 1. Hence,  0 w /
2 i
1
i 2 < ¶ j ¶  in both cases. 
 





2 D r w c + = )  
 












i 2 ¶ ¶ + + p = ¶ j ¶ . 
 
In case  0 Ai
2 = ,  0 Di
2 >  we again have  0 w / A i
2
i
2 = ¶ ¶ , while in case  0 Ai
2 > ,  0 Di
2 = , 
implicit differentiation of (2.8a), with  i
2 2
i
2 D r w = , gives us 
 






















2 > + p + - + p - = ¶ ¶  
 
Hence  0 w /
2 i
2
i 2 < ¶ j ¶  in both cases.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
We denote by 
i W  the LHS of (2.6) and by 
i V  the LHS of the  equation in (2.8a), where 
i
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where (observe the strict concavity of  ) c ( u i




i j , as shown in Lemma 2): 
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With the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of relative risk aversion  i
u R  and 
i Rj we get 
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where (A5) has the same sign as  i
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where (A6) has the same sign as 
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2 A  for fixed  i
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Further, as  0 ) A A q ( u i
2
i




2 q ) q , w ( A ¶ ¶ , 
which is determined by implicit differentiation of (2.8a) as  
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has the same sign as the numerator of the RHS of (A.9). Substituting the relative risk 
aversion  i
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where the positivity follows from the inequalities above. Inverting the first matrix on the RHS 
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(A.12)   27
Proof of Lemma 4: 
Let now denote W
i and V
i the  LHS's of (2.12) and (2.13), resp. The formula for implicit 
differentiation of these equations is the same as (A1), when  i
2 A  is replaced by  i
2 D  and q2 by 
r2.  
 
One derives immediately 
 












< p + =
¶
¶









,  (B1) 























< p p + =
¶
¶
,  (B2) 























,  (B3) 
    ( ) ) A q ( ' u R 1 i
1 1 u
i























+ p p =
¶
¶
  (B4) 




























0 > - p p + p + ”   (B5) 
 
and the definition of 
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>
_ 1.   
    Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Lemma 5: 
(i) We define W
i and V
i as in the proof of Lemma 3. The formula for implicit differentiation of 
(2.6) and the equation in (2.8a) is the same as (A1), where q 1,q2 are replaced by  , , i
2
i
1 p p  
resp. 
 
We find  
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2 / ) w , q , w ( A p ¶ ¶  denotes the change of annuity demand in 
period 1, for fixed  i
1 w , if  i
2 p  increases. It is determined by implicit differentiation of the 
equation in (2.8a) as 
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(Compare the analogous procedure (A7) – (A9), concerning the influence of q2). Altogether, 
we find  . 0 W i
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To see part (ii), we define W
i and V
i as in Lemma 4 and use the same formula (A1) for 
implicit differentiation of (2.12), (2.13), where  i
2 A , q1, q2 are replaced by  i
2 D ,  i
1 p ,  i
2 p  resp. 
 
We find  
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Using these computations, together with (B1), (B2) and (B5), in (A11) – (A14), it follows (note 
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Proof of Lemma 9:  





1 A ) 1 ( A ~ p + = , i = L,H. Using this relation,  1 ~ r  can be 




2 1 p + p + r , which is larger than  1 r , as  H
2 p  >  L
2 p . 
 
  From  (3.6) and (3.8), it follows that  i
2 1
i
2 D q ~ A ~ = . Using this relation, together with 
) ) 1 /(( ) 1 /( L
1 0
H
1 0 1 1 p g - p g = g - g ,  2 ~ r  can be written as  L
1
H
1 2 p p r , which is larger than  2 r , 
as  H
1 p  >  L
1 p .  
 







1 D ) 1 ( A ~ p p + = . Using this relation,  1 ~ r  can be 












2 2 p p + p p p + p r , which is smaller than  2 r , as  H
2 p  >  L
2 p . 
 
(ii)  First, we calculate the difference ( 1 q  -  1 q ~ ) from (3.9) and (3.11) as 
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r p + p r p + p
r - r p - p
,  
 
  which is positive due to  1 ~ r  >  1 r  and  H
1 p  >  L
1 p .  
 




~ p p r = r (see step (i) of 
this proof),  2 q ~  can be transformed to  
 
















r p p + p p
r p + p
= ,  (C1) 
 
  From (3.12) and (C1) it follows that the relative rate of return is equal to  
 










p r + p
r +
= ,  (C2) 
 
  which is greater than 1 due to  1 i
1 < p , for i = L,H.  
 
Finally, we show that  2 2 1 r q ~ q ~ > , which is equivalent to  0 q ~ r q ~
2 2 1 > - . Substituting (3.9) 
and (C2), the difference  2 2 1 q ~ r q ~ -  can be written as  
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r p + p r p + p
r - r p - p
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  which is positive, since  H
1 p  >  L
1 p  and  2 r  >  1 ~ r .  Q.E.D.   31
Proof of Lemma 10:  
(i)  We know that  i
1 1 2 1
i









1 1 2 1
i
1 A q ~ ) D A ~ ( q ~ A ~ A ~ q ~ ) q ~ , q ~ ( c = - = - =  
(see the proofs of Lemma 9 (i) and 8). Together with  1 q ~  <  1 q  (see Lemma 9 (ii)), it 




1 < . 
 
(ii)  We know that  i
2 2 2 1
i
2 D r ) r , q ( c =  and that  i
2 2 1
i
2 2 2 1
i
2 D q ~ q ~ A ~ q ~ ) q ~ , q ~ ( c = = . Together with 




2 > .  Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We show that for an individual of type L, the optimal consumption bundles ( i
2
i
1 c , c ) in both 
regimes lie to the right of the point of intersection of the consumption possibility curves (3.13) 
and (3.14), while the opposite holds true for an individual of type H. From this we conclude 
that an individual of type L prefers the simultaneous regime with the rates of returns  1 q  and 
2 r , while an individual of type H prefers the sequential regime with the payouts  2 1 q ~ , q ~ . 
 
We calculate the point of intersection of the possibility curves of an individual i = L,H, under 
both regimes by solving (3.13) and (3.14) for  i
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Moreover, we have from (2.2), (3.5) and (3.6)  
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and from (2.2), (3.7) and  0 Ai
2 =  
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p + p +
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As a preparation, we show in step (i) that  ) S ( c ) r , q ( c H
1 2 1
H
1 <  and in step (ii) that 
) S ( c ) q ~ , q ~ ( c L
1 2 1
L
1 > .  
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(i) The inequality  ) S ( c ) r , q ( c H
1 2 1
H
1 <  reduces to  
 





r q ~ q
) r q ~ q ~ )( 1 (
-
- p +
  (D4) 
 
  by use of (D1) and (D3). Note first that  1 1 q ~ q >  (see Lemma 9), hence  2 2 1 r q ~ q > , because 
we already know that  2 2 1 r q ~ q ~ > . Thus (D4) is equivalent to 
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2 2
H
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  Using the relation (C2) and inserting for  1 q ~ , 1 q , (see (3.9) and (3.11)), we can transform 
(D5) to: 
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Substituting for  1
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which reduces to  
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This expression is negative due to  H
1
L
1 p < p .  
 
(ii) Second, we have to show that  ) S ( c ) q ~ , q ~ ( c L
1 2 1
L
1 > , which by use of (D1) and (D2) reduces 
to 
 
  > 1 q ~
2 2 1
2 2 1 1
L
2
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) r q ~ q ~ ( q ) 1 (
-
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,  (D7) 
 
which is equivalent to (see the considerations following (D4)) 
 
  0 ) q ~ q r ( q ~ ) 1 ( r q L
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which reduces to  
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This expression is positive due to  L
1
H
1 p > p .  
 




1 < , which together with 
) S ( c ) r , q ( c H
1 2 1
H
1 <  implies that for both regimes consumption lies to the left of the point of 
intersection  ) S ( cH
1  of the consumption possibility curves of both regimes. As to the left of 
) S ( cH
1  the consumption set is larger for the sequential regime than for the simultaneous 
regime, it follows that the type-H individuals are better off with the sequential regime.  
 




1 >  (see Lemma 10) and  ) S ( c ) q ~ , q ~ ( c L
1 2 1
L
1 >  (see step (ii)) imply, 
by analogous reasoning, that the type-L individuals are better off with the simultaneous 
regime.  Q.E.D. 
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